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Abstract
The practice of balancing as a method of reasoning and decision making in cases of collision 
between constitutional rights has been frequently debated in legal literature worldwide as well 
as adopted by many national and international courts. The expansion of the method raises 
many objections and questions about its structure and rationality. In this paper the method 
will be analyzed by means of (1) its definition, (2) the main objections to its practice, (3) its 
structuring by means of the weight formula, and (4) a case study, in order to analyze the 
possibility of structuring the method within rational standards in a concrete case. The chosen 
case is a decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court regarding the permission from 
local courts to perform a data screening in order to look for potential terrorists that could have 
been planning attacks in Germany after the 11th September 2001 events in the USA.
Keywords: Balancing. Rational standards. Weight formula. Data screening. Data protection. 
Counterterrorism.
Resumo
O recurso à ponderação como método de decisão em casos de colisão entre direitos 
fundamentais tem sido debatido com frequência pela literatura jurídica assim como tem sido 
adotado por cortes em nível nacional e internacional. A expansão do método levanta muitas 
objeções e perguntas a respeito de sua estrutura e racionalidade. Neste artigo, o método será 
analisado por meio de (1) sua definição, (2) principais objeções contra a sua aplicação, (3) 
sua estrutura por meio da fórmula do peso, e (4) um estudo de caso, a fim de se analisar a 
possibilidade de se estruturar o método por critérios racionais de decidibilidade em um caso 
concreto. O caso escolhido corresponde a uma decisão da Tribunal Constitucional alemão 
sobre a permissão de cortes locais para a realização de busca de dados pessoais, a fim de se 
procurar terroristas em potencial que poderiam estar planejando ataques na Alemanha após 
os ataques de 11 de setembro de 2001 nos Estados Unidos.
Palavras-chaves: Ponderação. Critérios racionais de decidibilidade. Fórmula do peso. Busca de 
dados. Proteção de dados. Combate ao terrorismo.
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1 Introduction
The practice of balancing as a method of reasoning and decision making in cases 
of collision between constitutional rights has been frequently debated in legal literature 
worldwide as well as being adopted by many national and international courts.1 Its 
frequent use is observed not only by means of the various theoretical works about 
the theme in the last years,2 but also by means of the case law of many courts, as well 
as in countries with a common law tradition and in international courts such as the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
In the academic debate, there are authors that evaluate the method as the most 
suitable method of reasoning and decision making in the courts.3 Others emphasize 
the expansion of the idea of balancing in legal theory as well as in national and 
international jurisdictions.4 The expanded use of the method is often questioned in 
legal theory. While balancing has been used in the case law of some countries without 
questioning its basis and structure, new theoretical objections to the method have 
arisen. Therefore, it is possible to observe that the controversy regarding the practice of 
balancing is still current and has reached an international level.
In this paper, the method will be analyzed by means of (1) its definition, (2) the 
main objections to its practice, (3) its structure by means of the weight formula as a 
response to the objections, and (4) a case study, in order to analyze the possibility of 
structuring the method within rational standards in a concrete case.
1  See A. Stone Sweet and J. Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’, Colum-
bia Journal of Transnational Law (2008).
2  See, for example, D. Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurispru-
dence’, University of Toronto Law Journal (2007), 383–97, S. Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An assault 
on human rights?’, International Journal of Constitutional Law (2009), 468–93, J. Bomhoff, ‘Balancing, 
the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing as a Problematic Topic in Comparative (Constitutional) 
Law’, Hastings International & Comparative Law Review (2008), 555–86, C. Bernal Pulido, ‘Grun-
drechtsprinzipien in Spanien: Rationalität und Grenzen der Abwägung’ in J.-R. Sieckmann (ed.), Die 
Prinzipientheorie der Grundrechte: Studien zur Grundrechtstheorie Robert Alexys (Baden-Baden: No-
mos, 2007), J. Andrade Neto, ‘The Debatable Universality of the Proportionality Test and the Wide-
Scope Conception of Fundamental Rights’, Revista Brasileira de Direito (2016), 4–19, F. S. d. Morais 
and L. Zolet, ‘Constitutional Rights Expansion and Contributions from Robert Alexy’s Theory’, Re-
vista Brasileira de Direito (2016), 127–36; F. S. d. Morais, Ponderação e arbitrariedade: a inadequada 
recepção de Alexy pelo STF (Salvador: Editora JusPODIVM, 2016)
3  See D. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
4  See Stone Sweet and Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’.
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2 The definition of balancing
This paper depends on the definitions of and the distinction between principles 
and rules. The discussion regarding that distinction is not new.5 The distinction 
defined by Alexy is a norm-theoretic one.6 According to him, rules are definitive 
commands, meaning “norms that can only be either complied with or not”.7 On 
the other hand, principles are optimization commands; in other words, norms 
commanding that something be realized to the highest degree relative to both the 
factual and legal possibilities.8 This distinction implies different forms of application 
of rules and principles.
A conflict between rules “can only be solved by (1) either introducing an excep-
tion clause into one of the two rules or (2) declaring at least one of them invalid”.9 The 
justification of that form of application is based on the fact that rules are situated in a 
dimension of validity, and the definition of validity cannot be graduated.10 Rules as de-
finitive commands do not accept graduations of this characteristic. Therefore, a conflict 
between rules has to be solved by subsumption. One norm must be completely applied 
in the case and the other will then be declared as invalid.
On the other hand, when two principles collide one principle takes priority over 
the other depending on the circumstances of the concrete case. The conflict is centered 
in the dimension of weight of each principle. It is necessary to consider the factual and 
legal possibilities of the concrete case to evaluate the weights of each principle and de-
termine which principle has priority.11 Under different circumstances, the priority re-
lation between principles can be differently defined. Therefore, principles always com-
prise merely prima facie requirements.12 The priority of a principle is determined by 
means of balancing.13 Thus, balancing in a broad sense can be defined as an evaluation 
between two or more competing goods.14 In terms of a simple and introductory expla-
nation, balancing is a decision-making method to resolve collisions of principles. 
5  See R. Alexy, ‘On the Structure of Legal Principles’, Ratio Juris (2000), 294–304, at 294, and R. Alexy, 
‘Rechtsregeln und Rechtsprinzipien’ in R. Alexy, H.-J. Koch, L. Kuhlen and H. Rüßmann (eds.), Ele-
mente einer juristischen Begründungslehre (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), pp. 217–34, at p. 217.
6  R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Repr. 2010 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 47–9, R. 
Alexy, ‘The Construction of Constitutional Rights’, Law and Ethics of Human Rights (2010), 20–32, at 21.
7  Alexy, ‘On the Structure of Legal Principles’, 295.
8  Ibid., p. 295.
9  Ibid., p. 295.
10  R. Alexy, Teoria dos direitos fundamentais (São Paulo: Malheiros, 2008), p. 92.
11  Ibid., p. 83.
12  R. Alexy, ‘Formal Principles: Some Replies to Critics’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 12 
(2014), 511–24, at 512.
13  Ibid., p. 512.
14  In this paper, I will make reference to a conflict between two goods or principles as a matter of simpli-
fication. It is possible that more than two principles collide.
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Due to their optimization nature, colliding principles cannot be realized to their 
highest degree simultaneously. The balancing of principles implies the determination 
of a conditional priority relation between competing principles.15 The core of balancing 
consists in the relation formulated by the “Law of Balancing”:16 “The greater the degree 
of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater the importance of 
satisfying the other”.17 The evaluation of the weights of the principle follows this law.
Balancing is also the subject of the third sub-principle of the principle of 
proportionality, also known as the principle of proportionality in the narrower 
sense.18 It concerns the optimization relative to the legal possibilities at hand.19 The 
first two sub-principles, the sub-principles of suitability and necessity, concern 
optimization relative to the factual possibilities of the concrete case.20 As the 
principle of proportionality in the narrower sense is the main objection related to the 
proportionality test, this paper will concentrate on the issues related to balancing and 
not to the proportionality as a whole.
3 Objections to balancing
In this section, an overview of the objections to balancing will be delineated. 
Objections of various types against balancing are raised, but it is not possible to 
examine them only in a sealed manner, as there are close connections between and 
among them.
First of all, three main groups of objections will be delineated. Alexy, for 
example, points out the following three main critical approaches against balancing: 
objections to (1) its structure; (2) its rationality; and (3) its legitimacy.21 These 
objections are interrelated: the legitimacy of balancing depends on its rationality; in 
other words, its legitimacy depends on the development of a rational method within 
a coherent and consistent argumentation, and not an arbitrary one. The structure of 
the method is essential to define its rationality, because its rationality is evaluated 
by means of its structure. Therefore, as Alexy affirms, the core of the problem 
of balancing in law is a matter of its structure.22 In order to complete the critical 
15  See Alexy, ‘On the Structure of Legal Principles’, 297.
16  Alexy, ‘Formal Principles: Some Replies to Critics’, 513.
17  See R. Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing and Rationality’, Ratio Juris (2003), 131–40, at 136, 
Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, p. 408.
18  Alexy, ‘The Construction of Constitutional Rights’, 27.
19  Ibid., p. 27.
20  Ibid., p. 27.
21  R. Alexy, ‘The Weight Formula’ in J. Stelmach, B. Brozek and W. Zaluski (eds.), Studies in the Philoso-
phy of Law (Kraków: Jagiellonian Univ. Press, 2007), pp. 9–27, at p. 9.
22  Ibid., 9.
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overview, it is necessary to point out the specific objections that derive from those 
groups and the authors making the objections.
One of the specific objections related to the rationality, structure and 
methodology of balancing concerns its conceptual indeterminacy. The reason for this 
objection is the rhetorical formulation of the method, which does not have a well-
defined and clear structure. Moreover, balancing presents a lack of objective criteria 
for its practice. Without such criteria, a public monitoring of the decision, especially its 
argumentation and reasoning, would not be possible.23 Balancing would be practiced, 
therefore, through subjective and ideological judgments.
Another objection concerns the incommensurability and incomparability of the 
practice of balancing. A common unit of measure for the weights of the competing 
rights would be impossible to be established: there would be no available scale to 
measure and determine the principles’ weights.24 Some authors that criticize the method 
in this sense are Walter Leisner,25 Fischer-Lescano and Christensen,26 Jacco Bomhoff,27 
and Stravros Tsakyrakis28, among others. Habermas also addresses - although not so 
directly as the other authors - this objection, but his considerations are mainly related to 
the structure and character of the norm of values and their consequences.29
There are also objections to balancing as a metaphor of weights and the vagueness 
of its language. The method, as a metaphor of weights, they say, would not work 
because the definition of weights is too vague and therefore could include a great 
variety of human reasons and actions.30 In this sense, balancing should not be accepted 
as a method to resolve conflicts between constitutional rights, because it aims to be 
a neutral method, while in fact hiding an inherent moral judgment. In addition, the 
method suggests the idea of mathematical precision and a quantification of values 
through the metaphor of weights. There would be an illusion that here is a possible 
mechanical and precise way of weighing values, disregarding the complexity of the 
rights at stake.31
The impossibility of predicting the outcome of balancing is another objection. The 
consequence of this would be the creation of an “ad doc case law”, bringing instability to the 
23  See Bernal Pulido, ‘Grundrechtsprinzipien in Spanien: Rationalität und Grenzen der Abwägung’, 201–2.
24  Ibid., 202, and L. P. Sanchis, ‘Neoconstitucionalismo y ponderacíon judicial’ in M. Carbonell (ed.), 
Neoconstitucionalismo(s) (Madrid: Trotta, 2003), pp. 123–58, at p. 151.
25  W. Leisner, Der Abwägungsstaat (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997).
26  R. Christensen and A. Fischer-Lescano, Das Ganze des Rechts: Vom hierarchischen zum reflexiven Ver-
ständnis deutscher und europäischer Grundrechte (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2007).
27  Bomhoff, ‘Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing as a Problematic Topic in Compar-
ative (Constitutional) Law’.
28  Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An assault on human rights?’.
29  J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]: MIT Press, 1998), chapter 6.
30  See Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An assault on human rights?’, 469.
31  See ibid., p. 474.
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legal order and problems regarding legal certainty. Each outcome resulting from balancing 
would be unique, depending on the circumstances of each case and therefore it would be 
impossible to define general criteria and precedents. Because it is a method with significant 
conceptual indetermination, open to subjectivism, any pretension of universalization of the 
decisions coming from the application of balancing would be weakened.32
Another objection is related to the concept of State and to the legitimacy of the 
practice of balancing by the judiciary. These objections are made as a consequence 
of the indeterminacy of the structure and irrationality of the method as well as 
independent objections. If the result of balancing corresponds to a personal opinion 
involving preferences and priorities, without coherent reasoning in the decision, 
then there would be a lack of legitimacy for the judiciary to apply the method. The 
judiciary’s decisions are legitimized if they are developed based on a consistent and 
coherent reasoning. The legitimacy of this power is different from the legislative, as the 
latter is democratically elected and not appointed.
In this sense there are objections to the theory of principles and balancing 
related to the concept of constitutional rights as principles, the role of the German 
Constitutional Court and the lack of legitimacy of the court.33 The concept of 
optimization commands is criticized because it would be so broad that it could justify 
any state limitation of constitutional rights.34 The decision regarding which right 
should be protected and which should be limited in the concrete case would be merely 
arbitrary, guided by the personality of the judges and the current political atmosphere 
in the court. In addition, all the difficult cases would become a matter of constitutional 
rights and it would cause an over-constitutionalization of the legal system, which 
implies a violation of both the democratic principle and the separation of powers. 
Moreover, the optimization of a principle could not be objectively recognized by means 
of balancing. Therefore, a constitutional court could not adopt balancing objectively.35
Some authors that criticize the method in this sense are, for example, Ladeur36, 
Böckenförde37 and Schlink38. Böckenförde criticizes the difficulties of an interpretation 
32  See, for example, E.-W. Böckenförde, ‘Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen – zur gegenwärtigen Lage 
der Grundrechtsdogmatik’ in E.-W. Böckenförde (ed.), Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), pp. 159–99, at p. 174, K.-H. Ladeur, Kritik der Abwägung in der Grundrechts-
dogmatik (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), p. 29.
33  See, for example, B. Schlink, ‘The Dynamics of Constitutional Adjudication’, Cardozo Law Review 
(1995-1996), 1231–8, and B. Schlink, ‘German Constitutional Culture in Transition’, Cardozo Law Re-
view (1992-1993), 711–36.
34  See ibid., p. 721.
35  See Bernal Pulido, ‘Grundrechtsprinzipien in Spanien: Rationalität und Grenzen der Abwägung’, 204.
36  Ladeur, Kritik der Abwägung in der Grundrechtsdogmatik.
37  Böckenförde, ‘Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen – zur gegenwärtigen Lage der Grundrechtsdogmatik’, 
and E.-W. Böckenförde, ‘Grundrechtstheorie und Grundrechtsinterpretation’, NJW (1974), 1529–38.
38  B. Schlink, ‘Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit’ in Festschrift 50 Jahre Bundesverfassungsge-
richt, 2 vols. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), pp. 445–65, B. Schlink, ‘Freiheit durch Eingriffsabwehr 
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of constitutional rights by means of a value theory as well as the lack of legislative 
discretion as a consequence of the concept of optimization.39 According to him, a value 
theory could not offer a solution for a conflict between constitutional rights because 
there would be neither rational justification for the values involved and for a legal 
order of values as a whole, nor a recognizable system of rational preferences for the 
evaluation of the principles and for the establishment of the priority relationships.40 
Schlink affirms that it is not necessary to apply the method to resolve conflicts between 
constitutional rights. According to him, the practice of the two first sub-principles of 
the principle of proportionality – the sub-principles of suitability and necessity – would 
already provide the possibility of a technical and sufficient judgment to solve those 
conflicts. This is because this part of the principle of proportionality works only with 
prognostics; in other words, with judgments based on probability and not with mere 
subjective evaluations.41
4 The concept of rationality in the law42
After pointing out the objections to balancing, the weight formula as a response 
to the critics will be investigated. However, first it is necessary to provide some 
preliminary theoretical explanations, starting with which kind of rationality is sought 
and is desirable in law. This definition is important in order to determine whether 
balancing can be structured using rational standards and whether the decision 
resulting from its practice can be intersubjectively reasoned and justified.
The possible rationality of the social sciences in general, including law, is not the 
same as that which can be established by the natural sciences.43 Neither a mathematical 
exactness nor a mathematical-geometric model can be achieved in a legal decision. This 
is independent of whatever method is applied: neither balancing nor any reasoning in 
general can achieve them.44 For this reason, it is assumed that it is not possible to seek a 
strict rationality for law that completely excludes any subjectivity in the interpretation 
- Rekonstruktion der klassischen Grundrechtsfunktion’, Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift (1984), 
457–68, Schlink, ‘The Dynamics of Constitutional Adjudication’, and B. Schlink, Abwägung im Verfas-
sungsrecht, Schriften zum öffentlichen Recht (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1976), vol. 299.
39  See Böckenförde, ‘Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen – zur gegenwärtigen Lage der Grundrechtsdog-
matik’, and Böckenförde, ‘Grundrechtstheorie und Grundrechtsinterpretation’.
40  See ibid., p. 1530.
41  See Schlink, ‘Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit’.
42  It is not the intention here to exhaust the great debate about objectivity and rationality in law. The 
only objective is to establish theoretical assumptions of the subject which will be developed in the fol-
lowing sections of this paper.
43  See V. Afonso da Silva, Grundrechte und gesetzgeberische Spielräume (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), p. 102.
44  See ibid., p. 102.
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and practice of the law.45 Those who criticize balancing specifically for being a 
purely subjective method seem to suppose that there are other methods in juridical 
argumentation that would allow for a mathematical rationality.46
Therefore, a claim of hyper-rationality of balancing is rejected by this paper. 
Objectivity in an absolute sense cannot be guaranteed in law, because that would 
be utopia. It cannot be achieved or obtained in any legal order.47 Rationality in law 
and for balancing specifically can only be achieved within a certain limit; in other 
words, rationality in a weak sense.48 Rationality in a weak sense does not necessarily 
imply judgments reasoned only by the mere personal opinions of judges. It is not 
about judging in a decisionistic manner, according to personal wishes or beliefs, 
but according to reason. It is about the effort to justify each step taken to reach the 
decision. Each decision should aim to achieve a universally reasonable result.
In this sense, it is important to develop a procedure capable to structure the 
decision, explaining its justification and considering each part of its reasoning. This 
means a procedure that controls whether it is possible to identify and analyze the 
arguments in a decision. The arguments have to be considered acceptable and the 
results of the decision must be consistent with the underlying arguments. Thus, 
the rationality that is sought within a decision-making method corresponds to the 
possibility of justifying the arguments put forth to reach the decision.
Accepting this concept of rationality in a weak sense, any claim for absolute 
neutrality and impartiality in the practice of legal methods is also rejected. The 
practice of balancing and its structure as a legal method do not exclude the existence 
of personal opinions by practitioners of the law. However, this does not mean that the 
decisions are based solely on those opinions. Each decision has to observe requirements 
of reasoning and justification.
5 Models of balancing
Many of the objections that were analyzed above assume an exaggerated practice 
of balancing, speaking of an unjustified expansion of balancing or a “constitutional 
adjudicative state” in the current legal order, as if every legal issue becomes a matter 
of balancing.49 This kind of objection normally characterizes the method as arbitrary, 
without rational standards. It is argued that any result could be achieved within the 
practice of balancing. Use of the method would be the expression of the personal opinions 
45  See V. Afonso da Silva, O conteúdo essencial dos direitos fundamentais e a eficácia das normas consti-
tucionais (São Paulo, 2005), p. 190.
46  In this sense, see Afonso da Silva, Grundrechte und gesetzgeberische Spielräume, pp. 103–4.
47  See Bernal Pulido, ‘Grundrechtsprinzipien in Spanien: Rationalität und Grenzen der Abwägung’, 206.
48  See Afonso da Silva, Grundrechte und gesetzgeberische Spielräume, pp. 103–4.
49  In this sense about the objections, see L. Clérico, El examen de proporcionalidad em el derecho consti-
tucional (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 2009), p. 295, and Alexy, ‘Formal Principles: Some Replies to Critics’.
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of the legal practitioners, because there are no rational standards for its practice and 
weighting. However, this argument corresponds to a decisionistic model of balancing.50
The decisionistic model is just one of the two possible models of balancing. There 
exist two concepts of balancing: (1) the decisionistic model, and (2) the justified model. 
The definition used in this paper considers a justified model of balancing, but without 
the claim of finding a single correct answer in every case.51 According to this model, 
legal practitioners have to justify the conditional priority relation that results from 
the use of balancing. The justification of their decision has to properly follow rules of 
rational argumentation.52 In this concept, the method has to follow forms of argument 
in a rational legal discourse.
Moreover, the outcomes of balancing can be different considering (1) a 
decisionistic model; (2) a definitive model; or (3) a moderate model. The first model 
corresponds to the model the critics object to: every outcome is possible, without 
a claim of justification. The second one corresponds to a model where “balancing 
leads in a rational way to one outcome in every case”.53 This thesis, however, is not in 
accordance with the theory of principles; according to this theory, “balancing is not 
a procedure which leads necessarily to precisely one outcome in every case”.54 The 
third model asserts that “one outcome can be rationally established through the use 
of balancing, not in every case, but in at least some cases, and that the class of these 
cases is interesting enough to justify balancing as a method”.55 This aspect does not 
make balancing an arbitrary method.56 Therefore, a moderate and justified model of 
balancing is considered in this paper.
6 The weight formula
The weight formula represents a way of explaining, structuring and illustrating 
the reasoning within balancing in order to clarify how the evaluation between the 
principles is made and how the conditional priority relation is established. According 
to Alexy, the formula provides “a demonstration of how and why balancing is possible 
as a form of rational legal argument”.57 It expands the Law of Balancing, cited above.
By means of the Law of Balancing, what is compared and evaluated within the 
method can be clearly viewed: the degree of interference of one principle in detriment to 
50  In this sense, see Afonso da Silva, Grundrechte und gesetzgeberische Spielräume, p. 105.
51  See Alexy, Teoria dos direitos fundamentais, pp. 164–5.
52  Cf. Giorgio Maniaci, “Algunas notas sobre coherencia y balance en la teoría de Robert Alexy”, p. 164.
53  Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, p. 401.
54  Ibid., p. 402.
55  Ibid., p. 402.
56  Ibid., p. 402.
57  Alexy, ‘The Construction of Constitutional Rights’, 20.
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the importance of satisfying the other. Therefore, the evaluation consists in deciding the 
priority of a principle in a concrete case, where one is limited and the other is satisfied. 
The importance of the weight formula is that it provides standards for balancing 
decisions. It provides also a greater intersubjectivity in the establishment of the decision, 
as through it the choice between one principle or another is more detailed than a simple 
preference. In this sense, the formula represents an argument against the critics:
jjj
iii
ji RWI
RWIW
⋅⋅
⋅⋅
=,
It is important to explain in detail how the weight formula is well structured 
through variables and a scale that permits an evaluation of the variables through 
rational standards. First of all, Pi represents the principle that is limited or not satisfied. 
Pj represents the colliding principle. Wi,j represents “the concrete weight of the 
principle Pi relative to the colliding principle Pj”.58 In order to construct the formula, 
the Law of Balancing is divided into three steps.59 In the first, the degree of restriction 
or non-satisfaction of one principle in detriment of the other is established. In the 
second, the importance of satisfying the competing principle is evaluated. The third 
and last one analyses if the importance of satisfying the competing principle justifies 
the limitation or the non-satisfaction of the other principle.60 These steps are present in 
the formula through the variables Ii and Ij.
The intensity of the intervention in Pi is represented by Ii.61 Alexy uses the terms 
“intensity of intervention” and “degree of restriction or non-satisfaction” as being the 
same terms.62 Ii represents a concrete quantity, because interferences in principles are 
always concrete.63 Its abstract weight is represented by Wi. On the other side of the 
formula, Ij represents the importance of satisfying Pj or, in other words, the degree of 
importance of satisfying it. The abstract weight of Pj is represented by Wj. In collisions 
between constitutional rights, the abstract weights of the colliding rights are frequently 
equal. In these cases, the abstract weights cancel each other out and therefore they are 
not a relevant factor in the decision.64
The objection concerning the lack of rational standards within the balancing 
decision would be justified only if rational judgments regarding (1) the intensity of the 
interference in a principle, (2) the degree of importance of the other principle, and (3) 
the relation between them could not be achieved.65 However, Alexy affirms that rational 
58  Alexy, ‘Formal Principles: Some Replies to Critics’, 513.
59  Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, p. 401.
60  Ibid., p. 401.
61  Ibid., p. 405.
62  Ibid., p. 405.
63  Ibid., p. 405.
64  Ibid., p. 406.
65  Ibid., p. 401.
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judgments are possible in those cases if a scale is established. Alexy’s classification 
follows a three-grade or triadic scale classifying the stages as ‘light’ (l), ‘moderate’ (m) 
and ‘serious’ (s), and which are then used to define the degrees of interference (Ii) and 
importance of satisfying a principle in a concrete case (Ij).66 The establishment of clear 
degrees provides rational standards for balancing decisions.67 The triadic scale can be 
represented also by the simple geometric sequence 20, 21, and 22, that is, 1, 2, and 4.68 The 
allocation of numbers turns the relations to be evaluated through the weight formula 
more illustrative and clearer. The variables are thus evaluated through this triadic scale.
The establishment of a scale within a three-grade model, that evaluates the 
intensity of the intervention in a principle and importance of satisfying the other, does 
not represent an attempt to commensurate the rights in question. What is established is 
an ordinal scale related to the degrees of the intensity of the intervention in a principle 
or of the importance of satisfying the other and not to the principles themselves, with 
an argumentative purpose for the practice of balancing, with no objective to establish 
a cardinal scale.69 The scale allows different legal practitioners to use the method based 
on the same standards – namely the three degrees of the scale - in relation to the 
degrees of the colliding principles.
Based on these definitions, the controversy would be how to determine and 
evaluate the intensity of intervention in one right and the degree of importance of 
satisfying the other using the triadic scale. To define those degrees, the elements of the 
concrete case have to be considered, namely the questioned measure and the effects 
that its implementation and non-implementation have on the relevant principles.70 
Thus, in a conflict between the freedom of expression and personality rights, the 
intensity of a intervention in the first principle could be determined by the question 
how intensively the prohibition of an expression interferes with the freedom of 
expression, considering the expression itself, the situation, the limited measure and 
damages of the concrete case.71 To determine the degree of importance of satisfying 
the personality rights, the question would be “what omitting or not implementing 
66  Ibid., p. 402. The abstract weights of the principles (Wi and Wj) are also defined by this scale.
67  As Alexy affirms, the triadic model does not exhaust the possibilities of graduation (See Alexy, ‘The 
Construction of Constitutional Rights’, 30, and Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, p. 412). But 
the more values are inserted in a scale, the more difficult it will be to evaluate the variables, as the 
differences between the degrees will be less clear (ibid., p. 413). And as “the justifiability of statements 
about intensities is a condition of the rationality of balancing”, a graduation of the variables in the 
weight formula can work only with relatively crude scales. (Alexy, ‘The Construction of Constitutional 
Rights’, 31).
68  Ibid., p. 31.
69  See the detailed explanation about commensurability and comparability: V. Afonso da Silva, ‘Com-
paring the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles, Balancing and Rational Decision’, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2011), 273–301, at 287–8.
70  Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, p. 406.
71  Ibid., p. 406.
52
Revista Brasileira de Direito, Passo Fundo, vol. 14, n. 2, p. 40-63, Maio-Agosto, 2018 - ISSN 2238-0604
the interference with the freedom of expression … would mean for the protection of 
personality”.72 Therefore, the evaluation considers the concrete case and also the exact 
opposite case to determine the degrees in balancing, considering the hypothesis if 
the limited right had not been interfered with. Moreover, other concrete situations of 
interference or satisfying a right can be compared to determine the degrees in question. 
Through such a comparison, some criteria can be defined, and based on these criteria it 
can be established if the degree of an intervention is serious, moderate or light.
The other variable in the weight formula concerns the reliability of the 
empirical and normative assumptions in relation to “the question of how intensive 
the interference with Pi is, and how intensive the interference with Pj would be if the 
interference with Pi were omitted”.73 It is represented by Ri and Rj.74 As Alexy affirms, 
it is a variable that refers to the knowledge of things.75 It is not always possible to be 
certain about the empirical and normative premises used to evaluate the degrees of 
interference and importance of the principles. The relation between the reliability 
levels of the premises and the concrete weights of the principles is explained through 
the epistemic law of balancing, also known as “the second law of balancing”: “The 
more heavily an interference in a constitutional right weighs, the greater must be 
the certainty of its underlying premises”.76 A triadic scale is also used to evaluate 
the epistemic degrees of the reliability variables. The degrees of an epistemic scale 
are defined as: certain or reliable (r), maintainable or plausible (p) and, not evidently 
false (e).77 As epistemic uncertainty weakens the evaluations regarding the intensity 
of the interference and of the importance of the principles in the concrete case, these 
epistemic grades are expressed by the following simple geometric sequence: 20, 2-1, and 
2-2, that is, 1, 1/2, and 1/4.78
Having established the degrees of the variables by means of the triadic scale, 
the third and last step of balancing corresponds to evaluating if the importance of 
satisfying the competing principle justifies the limitation or the non-satisfaction of 
the other principle, considering also the other variables. The weight formula illustrates 
how the relationship between those degrees is evaluated (see above). The overall 
concrete weight of Pi is represented by iii RWI ⋅⋅ and the overall concrete weight of Pj is 
represented by jjj RWI ⋅⋅ .
Pi takes precedence over Pj when the value of Wi,j is greater than 1. This means 
that the overall concrete weight of Pi is heavier than the overall concrete weight of Pj, 
72  Ibid., p. 407.
73  Alexy, ‘Formal Principles: Some Replies to Critics’, 513.
74  Alexy divides the variable R in two other variables in his most recently published article (See ibid.). 
But for the objective of this paper, the explanation of a common reliability variable is sufficient.
75  Ibid., p. 514.
76  Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, p. 418.
77  Ibid., p. 419.
78  Ibid., p. 419.
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considering also eventual uncertainties in the case. As an example, considering if the 
reliability of all the empirical and normative assumptions is certain (r =1), the intensity 
of intervention in Pi is serious (s = 22= 4), the importance of satisfying Pj is moderate 
(m = 21= 2), and the abstract weights of both principles are the same (both serious, s = 
22= 4), then they cancel each other out and are not a relevant factor in the decision. The 
weight formula would illustrate this constellation:
2
142
144
, =⋅⋅
⋅⋅
=
⋅⋅
⋅⋅
=
jjj
iii
ji RWI
RWIW
On the other hand, Pj takes precedence over Pi when the value of Wi,j goes below 
1. There are also cases where the result of the weight formula is exactly 1. These cases 
represent stalemate situations. A stalemate situation occurs if the overall concrete 
weights of the colliding principles are evaluated in the same way.
In a stalemate situation, the balancing stipulates no result, as no principle takes 
precedence through the balancing decision.79 The critics frequently justify their 
objections by basing them on stalemate cases. However, this does not mean that 
the procedure of evaluation using balancing is not rational. Actually, it can only be 
concluded that the overall concrete weights of the principles are the same by comparing 
the principles and applying the weight formula. This is a counter-argument against the 
objection, which states that the stalemate cases prove incomparability.
Moreover, a stalemate gives cause for legislative discretion in the concrete 
case. The legislator has the discretion to decide which solution is better according to 
political reasons. A stalemate case means that the constitutional court must defer to 
the legislative power in this case. The legislative decision regarding the preference of 
principles must be followed by the judiciary. Thus, stalemates represent an answer 
to the objection that affirms that the theory of optimization does not allow for any 
legislative discretion.
There are other details and new discussions concerning the development of the 
weight formula.80 However, in this paper the main features of the formula have been 
presented and explained. In order to better exemplify the possibility of structuring 
balancing within rational standards, a concrete case will now be analyzed and 
investigated through the criteria exposed within the weight formula.
79  See R. Alexy, ‘Die Gewichtsformel’ in J. Jickeli, P. Kreutz and D. Reuter (eds.), Gedächtnisschrift für 
Jürgen Sonnenschein (Berlin, 2003), pp. 771–92, at p. 782.
80  See, for example, M. Klatt and J. Schmidt, ‘Epistemic Discretion in Constitutional Law’, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 10 (2012), 69–105
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7 Case study: Data screening, the protection 
of personal data and counterterrorism
After the terrorist attacks on the 11th September 2001 in the United States of 
America, it came out that a few of the terrorists that were involved in the planning 
and execution of the attacks had residences in Germany and had attended German 
universities. After this discovery, some German federal states enacted laws that 
permitted data screening in order to uncover other potential terrorists (called 
“sleepers”), that might be planning attacks.81 The case analyzed by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court82 questioned the authorization of local courts to proceed with data 
screening that was based on the law of the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia.
The data screening defined by the law corresponds to a preventive instrument, 
which determines the profile of suspects or “potential terrorists” based on personal 
information matches, such as information obtained through residence registration and 
bank accounts, among others. This procedure was developed and applied in Germany 
in 1970 to combat terrorism, in an attempt to discover people involved in the “Red 
Army Fraction” (RAF – “Rote Armee Fraktion” in German) terrorist organization.83 
As the terrorists of that organization used to pay their bills in cash, it was determined 
that electric power and telephone companies had to inform which of their clients had 
been paying their bills in that manner. The data provided was matched with other 
information, so that people with false identities could be identified.84 By the end of 
the procedure, a list with suspects was compiled, and based on this data the police 
investigated the addresses on the list.
In the current case, the law that permitted data screening was the Policy Law of 
the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (PolG - Polizeigesetz des Landes Nordhein-
Westfalen). Its article 31, paragraph 1º, determines that the police are allowed to request 
the transfer of personal data and other related data of certain groups of persons that 
is stored in the archives of public and non-public institutions if deemed necessary for 
defense against a current threat or for the security of the State, of the federal states, or 
for the security of the physical integrity, life or liberty of a person. Moreover, the law 
stipulates that an authorization of a local court is necessary for the realization of the 
data screening. On 2nd October 2001, a data screening was allowed by the local court of 
Düsseldorf (Amtsgericht Düsseldorf), following a request of the Düsseldorf police. The 
81  More information about the concept of “sleepers”, see W. Achelpöhler and H. Niehaus, ‘Data Screen-
ing as a Means of Preventing Islamist Terror-ist Attacks on Germany’, German Law Journal (2004), 
495–513, at 495.
82  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, 4th April 2006.
83  See G. Kett-Straub, ‘Data Screening of Muslim Sleepers Unconstitutional’, German Law Journal (2006), 
967–75, at 968; and decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 3.
84  See F. Müller and T. Richter, ‘Report on the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s (Federal Constitucional 
Court) Jurisprudence in 2005/2006’, German Law Journal (2008), 161–94, at 179.
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current threat was justified by the fact that, after the September 11th attacks, the danger 
of new attacks was still present, given that the terrorist groups were organized and 
active on an international basis.
With the authorization, all public residence archives in the Federal State of North 
Rhine-Westphalia, the central archive of foreigners in Cologne and all the universities 
in the region were obligated to transmit all the data related to males born between 1st 
October 1960 and 1st October 1983.85 The profile sought by the police as being possible 
terrorists corresponded to men of the Islamic faith, 86 aged between 18 and 40 years, 
students, or who had been students, in German universities, and from a country or 
citizens of certain countries with a predominantly Islamic population.87 Approximately 
5.2 million people’s data was transferred due to the screening.88
A Moroccan Muslim student then legally questioned the authorization of the 
local court. He obtained negative responses both from the regional court (Landgericht 
Düsseldorf) and from the higher regional court (Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf). Because 
of these negative responses, he filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court, arguing 
a violation of the fundamental right to self-determination of information (based 
on Article 2 (1) in conjunction with Article 1 (1) of the Basic Law of Germany).89 In 
addition, he argued the lack of evidence demonstrating the existence of a current danger 
justifying the authorization of data screening, a presupposition of the law itself.90
8 The practice of balancing in the concrete case
Using this concrete case, the practice of balancing and the possibility of 
structuring it within rational standards will be analyzed. In order to reach a decision, 
the court tried to establish criteria and standards to determine the intensity of 
intervention and the importance of satisfying the colliding principles. In the course 
of the construction of the justification of the case, the court sought concepts from 
its own past decisions, making references to several precedents and to other similar 
balancings.91 The argumentation of the court will be investigated here in detail.
85  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 12.
86  Obtaining information regarding a person’s “religion” is easy through public archives in Germany 
because people must inform their religion while registering their residences.
87  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 13.
88  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 28.
89  Article 1 (1): “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state 
authority”. Article 2 (1): “Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar 
as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law”. 
90  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 34.
91  Thus, the practice of the balancing is not “ad hoc”, as it considers precedents and concepts that were 
already adopted by the court.
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In the collision between constitutional rights of the concrete case, the principles 
to be protected through the data screening are the security of the State, of the federal 
states, and the physical integrity, life or liberty of a person. On the other side, the 
limited principles are the right to self-determination of information and the rights of 
personality, as the right to privacy. The constitutional court based its analysis on the 
following assumption and general rule: “intense fundamental rights’ limitations must 
be considered whether the levels of suspicion or of danger are determined”92 and “this 
assumption is served by the data screening, if the legislator connects the existence of a 
concrete danger against the threatened fundamental right”.93
To investigate this assumption, the court evaluates first the concrete weight of 
the intervention on the right to informational self-determination in the constitutional 
complaint. For this purpose, the court establishes some criteria, such as: how many 
people’s data were screened by means of the measure; if the people investigated gave 
any reason for the information screening; the extension of the individual damage 
in relation to the people that were investigated; how intensive was the collective 
damage during the data screening; and under which conditions the damages could 
have occurred. To evaluate these criteria, the court considers if those affected by the 
data screening remained anonymous during the process, which information was 
collected, and which are the disadvantages of the measure against the individuals.94 
The court affirms that these criteria were developed by itself in previous decisions in 
its jurisdiction, where fundamental rights related to information were limited, as, for 
example, in decisions on bank secrecy and related to the inviolability of the domicile.95
Based on the precedents, the court affirms that even when the information found 
by data screening provokes a low intensive interference in the right of personality, as 
the screening generally intervenes within the scope of protection of the fundamental 
right of article 10(1) and 13(1) of the German Basic Law, the interference falls in the 
case of a considerable intervention in the general fundamental right of informational 
self-determination.96 Moreover, it is necessary to evaluate the interference considering 
the extension of the authorization for the data screening, as well as the possibilities of 
matches between the collected data. This first analysis, based on previous decisions, 
serves as a general standard to be considered in the evaluation of the degree of the 
restriction in the right of self-determination in the concrete case.
After this analysis, the court focuses on examining the criterion “content” to 
determine the degree of the intervention in the constitutional law. The intensity of 
92  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 137.
93  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 89.
94  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 94.
95  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 95.
96  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 96. Article 10 (1): 
“The privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications shall be inviolable”; article 13 (1): “The 
home is inviolable”.
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the intervention in the right of self-determination of the information depends on the 
contents that were obtained through the screening. Especially considered is to what 
degree the information found and its matches with other data reach the essence of 
the personality and how this content will be used and disseminated. In addition, the 
matches of the transmitted data can, to a certain extent, result in new information 
about the investigated individuals and increase the intensity of intervention in the 
constitutional law.
The law that substantiated the authorization in the concrete case establishes that 
the only content that cannot be transmitted in any case is the information protected 
by professional secrecy. There is no other limitation for an authorization of screening 
of other contents. The possible authorization in the law also includes the collection 
of personal data of a high importance to the private sphere of the individual, such 
as religious conviction.97 In the concrete case, the court argues that there was a high 
intensive limitation in the constitutional right because of the variety and the extent of 
the data screening that was authorized by the local court.98
Based on the data that can be collected, the court is concerned about the 
possibility of generating a stigmatizing effect for those who meet the screening 
criteria.99 In this case, the data screening had focused on foreigners from certain 
origins and of the Muslim faith. The investigative measure can have a stigmatizing 
effect on those individuals and indirectly increase the risk for them of being 
discriminated in their daily or professional life. The consequences of differentiating 
a religion and people belonging to a certain region increase the intensity of the 
intervention in the constitutional right.
Moreover, the risk that such data can flow beyond the State’s objectives must 
be considered.100 The law does not allow the development of catalogs or registers of 
personal profiles, but the gathering and matching of data can lead to the elaboration 
of personal profiles and, through this, enable particularly intense interventions in the 
constitutional rights.101 In the concrete case, this issue is very problematic because, 
considering the criteria “number of affected people” and “data extension”, the screening 
reached a great number of people, with a great extension of data. In relation to the 
criterion if the investigated people presented concrete reasons for the search, many of 
them did not raise any suspicion. The court evaluates that the freedom of an individual 
is limited more intensely the less he or she gives reason for the state intervention. 
Thus, not only the overall number of people that were screened but also the number 
of suspected people in the search must be considered to evaluate the intensity of the 
97  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraphs 99, 101.
98  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 102.
99  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraphs 111, 112.
100  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 105.
101  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 106.
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intervention through the screening. If the search criteria are not specific, the screening 
can reach a great quantity of data from people who do not raise any suspicion.
Considering that analysis, the court compared the concrete case with the RAF 
case.102 In the concrete case, the data screening looked for supposed terrorists that had 
not yet committed any attack, but who might commit one in the future. In the RAF 
case, the data screening had focused on criminals that were already identified as such. 
In the concrete case, there were no specific criteria about the profile of the criminals. 
The data screening was based on very general and overarching search criteria.103 As 
the search criteria was very general and broad, the common well-being is also affected 
in this situation. This is because the right of self-determination is an elementary 
functional condition of the citizen’s capacity to act, founded in a democratic 
community and with liberties. Such a screening creates a risk of abuse and a sense of 
being watched by the State.
However, the court affirms that this analysis itself does not determine that 
the authorization for the data screening was not proportional. It is necessary to 
investigate if the data screening had as its objective the prevention of a concrete 
danger.104 Therefore, the importance of satisfying the colliding constitutional good 
in the concrete case must be evaluated. The concrete importance of the colliding 
constitutional good is defined by means of the concept of a concrete danger. The 
State has the duty to combat terrorism and to preserve democracy and the collective 
liberty.105 The promotion and enforcement of security is a state objective, but it is 
necessary to establish an adequate balance between freedom of individuals and 
security.106 The balance must be established between the intensity of the intervention 
in the constitutional rights, the facts of the concrete case, such as the extension of the 
measure, and the weight of the constitutional rights to be protected.
Considering this, the main reasoning for the decision is that the measure is only 
allowed in the cases of the existence of a concrete danger to the constitutional good to 
be protected, since the intensity of the intervention in the constitutional rights through 
the procedure of data screening is high.107 In the concrete case, the court affirms that 
the authorization for that screening was not proportional, because there was a lack of a 
concrete danger.
To evaluate the concreteness of the danger, the tribunal investigates aspects 
similar to the epistemic variable of the weight formula, related to the underlying 
empirical and normative premises used to evaluate the degrees of interference and 
102  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 119.
103  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 119.
104  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 125.
105  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 126.
106  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 128.
107  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 133.
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importance of the principles in the case: “The heavier is the threat or the damage in 
the constitutional good [the good to be protected, namely the security of the citizens] 
and the less heavy is the intervention in the constitutional right [the informational 
self-determination], the less likely must be the probability that the threat or breach of a 
constitutional right can be realized, and the lesser must be the facts, which serve as a 
basis for suspicion”.108
In other words, if the intensity of the intervention in the right to self-determination 
is high, the probability that the danger or the threat will be concretized must be equally 
high and the facts related to the suspects of committing this future threat must be clear 
and considerable. The higher is the intensity of the intervention in the constitutional 
right, the greater and the more certain must be the probability and the substantiated basis 
of the facts of the prognosis in the concrete case. Therefore, high intensive interventions 
must occur only if there are well-defined suspects and levels of danger.
Article 31 of the law of the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia stipulated as a 
requisite for the authorization for a data screening the “current danger”. The definition 
of current danger corresponds to a situation where “the effect of the harmful event has 
already begun or which the immediate effect is to occur in a close time with a secure 
and well-delimited probability”.109 Nevertheless, the court considered that the existence 
of a current danger is not a constitutional obligation.110 And while searching for data 
under the requirement of imminent threat or danger, there is the possibility of the 
measure being applied too late. To solve the disadvantages of the concept of “current 
danger”, the court interprets the law as the necessity of there existing a concrete 
danger.111 Therefore, a concrete evaluation of the probability is necessary, since the 
mere assumption or possibility is not enough to justify the intervention.112
In the concrete case, the justification of the local tribunals for the authorization 
was based on a general and broad threat, a consequence of the attacks of 11th September 
2001. However, the general and broad danger of an international terrorist attack or 
foreign policy tensions are not sufficient to justify a data screening.113 A concrete 
danger or threat of attacks in Germany was not found in the concrete case. Thus, the 
court decides that the contested decisions from the local and regional courts did not 
define the content of current danger sufficiently. The court affirms that the existence of 
a concrete danger is one of the requisites for an authorization of a data screening and 
that the concreteness represents the content of the concept of current danger.
For that reason, the German Constitutional Court argues that the decisions of 
the local and regional courts had not paid attention to the fact that the proportionality 
108  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 136.
109  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 142.
110  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 143.
111  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 144.
112  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 145.
113  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraph 147.
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of the authorization for such a data screening depends on the existence of a concrete 
danger and on a certain probability that a violation of the constitutional good will 
occur, considering not only the size of the possible damage, but also the severity and 
the possibility of success of the intervention that will be undertaken in order to avoid 
the danger.114 The authorization of the data screening in the case presents constitutional 
deficiencies and was not proportional.
By means of the reasoning of the German Constitutional Court, the variables 
and criteria that were analyzed through the weight formula were clearly viewed, such 
as the intensity of the intervention and the importance of satisfying the constitutional 
rights in the case as well as the epistemic premises. The evaluation of such variables was 
justified and the court considered also its precedents and compared the criteria used in 
similar past cases. The court developed the reasoning of those variables in the practice 
of the balancing in a justified way. 
It is not necessary that the court states expressly the use of the weight formula 
according to a particular piece of literature or author, or by means of a long theoretical 
explanation or extensive descriptions about the origin of the method. In the decision of 
the German Constitutional Court, the only literary quotes used were in order to define 
new concepts related to terrorism, concepts that had not yet been addressed in its 
previous cases. There is no need for extensive methodological theorizations, but rather 
the application of criteria and standards of the formula in a clear way in practice.
Lastly, it should be noted that the fact that it is possible to structure a balancing 
by means of rational standards does not mean that balancing leads to a single correct 
answer. As was previously explained, disagreements about the evaluation of the 
variables and the criteria applied through the method are possible. In the above case 
of data screening, for example, the judge Evelyn Haas wrote a divergent opinion. She 
considered and investigated the same variables, but evaluated the situation differently 
from the majority of the court and reached a different conclusion.
114  Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 BvR 518/02, paragraphs 154, 158.
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